



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
—POLITIC5081—

Spring term 2018
Last update: January 17, 2018

Lecture: Mondays, 14:00-15:00, Main Building, Room 253 Gilbert Scott

Seminar 1: Mondays, 15:00-16:00, 8 The Square, Room 324 Cosgrove

Seminar 2: Mondays, 16:00-17:00, 8 The Square, Room 324 Cosgrove

Dr Patrick Bayer

Lecturer in International Relations

Office: Adam Smith Building, Room #1310

Office hours: By appointment

Email: patrick.bayer@glasgow.ac.uk

Web: <http://www.patrickbayer.com>

Twitter: [@polEconomist](https://twitter.com/polEconomist)

Character of the course

International organizations (IOs), like the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, NATO, or the European Union have become common place in how governments govern their international relations. IOs are often seen as the solution to international cooperation problems, be it in areas of conflict, trade, human rights, or the global environment. Whether IOs can live up to this promise and change national governments' behaviour to indeed solve global cooperation problems will be central question this course addresses. Specifically, we will examine why IOs differ in their rules and decision-making processes and how this variation translates in different outcomes.

The first part of the class builds the theoretical and analytical foundation to address these key questions in a principled manner across different policy domains, while the second part applies these insights to specific IOs. We will discuss prominent IOs, such as the World Bank, IMF, or NATO together with newer forms of both transnational governance and international courts.

Course contents and dates

The course is structured along two parts: The first part focuses on the analytical foundations to develop a deeper understanding of key issues, debates, and arguments that matter for IO research. We will study IOs along their life cycle, from “birth” to “death” alongside differences in design, membership, and IO effectiveness. This will help us appreciate variation across policy fields and cooperation problems as well as methodological challenges and the importance of sound research designs.

Part II is more applied. It seeks to apply the analytical tools developed in the first part of the course to prominent IOs across various domains, such as economic relations, international security, human rights, the global environment, or to “non-traditional” IOs, such as international courts. Students will have a say in the particular IOs we will focus on. The table below provides a summary of the course topics and class dates.

PART I: FOUNDATIONS		
Week 1	Jan 8	Introduction
Week 2	Jan 15	IO formation and design
Week 3	Jan 22	Power and informal governance
Week 4	Jan 29	Delegation and bureaucrats
Week 5	Feb 5	Compliance and enforcement
Week 6	Feb 12	IO effectiveness
Week 7	Feb 19	<i>No class</i>

PART II: APPLICATIONS		
Week 8	Feb 26	Economic relations
Week 9	Mar 5	International security
Week 10	Mar 12	Other IOs
Week 11	Mar 19	International courts

Aims

The course goals are as follows:

- To introduce students to the main theoretical arguments and concepts around IO formation, IO interaction with other actors such as national governments, and their effects on international cooperation.
- To analyse differences and similarities in the institutional design, membership, and rules of different IOs and their implications for successful conflict resolution and global governance.
- To equip students with a deep understanding about the structure and inner workings of major IOs, like the World Bank, IMF, WTO, NATO, and others, from different policy areas.
- To train students in the rigorous empirical analysis of the functioning of IO in view of research design and methodological challenges.

Intended learning outcomes

By the end of the course students should be able to demonstrate through class participation and varied forms of assessment that they:

- To understand the key theoretical debates along an IO's life cycle.
- To assess why IOs differ in their institutional design, membership, and rules depending on policy field and the underlying cooperation problem.
- To evaluate the effectiveness of IOs in terms of problem solving and international governance and to know about methodological challenges around measuring effectiveness.
- To formulate research questions and design appropriate research designs to answer them in the context of IOs.
- To gain expert knowledge about the functioning of major IOs, like the World Bank, IMF, WTO, or NATO.
- To apply the developed analytical toolkit and expertise to any other IO of their interest.
- To situate the role of IOs in the broader context of international relations scholarship.

Format of teaching

The course consists of a one-hour, weekly lecture and a one-hour, weekly seminar. The seminar is to facilitate a thorough discussion of the material presented during the lecture and is to help students to deepen their understanding of the covered arguments and texts; students only need to attend the seminar they were assigned to.

This class is meant to train students in how to apply academic findings to current problems at the intersection of IOs and international politics. This requires everyone to have carefully read all required readings *prior* to each seminar session. We will do a lot of group work during the seminars, so without adequate preparation you will not get much out of the seminars. I expect every student to be able to answer the following *four key questions* about any given reading:

- What is the research question that is addressed?
- What is the key argument the author(s) present?
- What is the conclusion/main finding?
- Which aspect(s) did you find interesting/problematic?

While I understand the time commitment this entails, coming prepared well to class is essential for advanced academic discussion. This is admittedly an intensive course, but the upside is that you will get much more out of it, the better prepared you are. If you do not have the time to read the papers in full, you should at least always allow yourself enough time to skim the readings, so that you are in a position to answer the above questions. Skimming should be the exception though, but *coming to class unprepared is absolutely unacceptable!* Also note that students in the past found this exercise very rewarding.

In addition to weekly academic readings, I will also send one or two further newspaper articles, blog posts, or short videos (typically by Friday each week), which relate to the topics covered in class. We will discuss these in the seminars as well, in particular, in terms of their relevance for the academic debates. The main idea of these additional readings is to demonstrate how the concepts and analytical frameworks from the class travel to real world politics. For this to work, you should have read the academic literature *before* you go through these additional readings.

Assessment and essay questions

Formative assessment: There are two forms of formative assessments (= non-graded assessment) in this class, a verbal and a written one. The verbal assessments are brief summaries of the newspaper articles and how they relate to the academic debate (see above); they are meant to facilitate class discussions. The written formative assessment is a one-page summary (1.5 spacing) of a single academic paper of your choice, answering the central four questions highlighted above. Written formative assessments can be submitted at any time during the semester, but as they will prove most useful for the midterm essay, they should be done before the midterm essay deadline in week 7.

This assignment is *neither graded nor compulsory*, but should provide students with feedback on their writing. The formative assessments are modelled after the tasks in the summative assessments and should hence help you prepare for them.

Summative assessment: The summative assessment (= graded assessment) comprises *three* different assignments.

- Midterm essay (60% of grade). The essay comes in the form of two short answer questions (see below). The word limit for each answer is 1,000 words \pm 10% as I prefer concise write-ups without any clutter. Thinking carefully about what to include and not to include is a necessity. When writing your essay, think of your audience as someone who has no specific knowledge about IOs, so make sure you present your arguments and materials in an accessible way, while keeping descriptive parts short and focusing on the analysis. The deadline for the mid-term essay is Friday, February 23, 2018 at 16:00.
- IO factsheet (30% of grade). This is a group work assignment, where student groups will prepare a written memo (1,500 words \pm 10%) about an IO of their choice. The memo should

offer a description of the core functions of an IO, but also analyse the IO in light of the academic arguments developed in the first part of the class; adding IO-specific references to the document is advisable. Student groups will also give a short 10-15 minute presentation during the final four weeks of class. The assignment is due on the Monday at 14:00 during the week in which a group is to present; the IO factsheet and the presentation slides are to be shared with fellow students by uploading them to the Moodle forum.

- Research note (10%). The research note consists of a brief write-up (500 words \pm 10%) that develops (i) a research question and (ii) an appropriate research design that speaks to a gap in the IO literature and is based on a recent newspaper article. This assignment does not ask you to carry out the research, but to develop a plan that is grounded in theory and discusses a current, publicly debated topic on the role of IOs in light of the arguments presented in the class. The research note can be handed in at any time throughout the class, with a final deadline on Tuesday, April 17, 2018 at 16:00.

For each assignment, two identical copies should be submitted, i.e., a hard copy to the post-graduate office and an electronic copy through the Moodle submission functionality. For the group work, two copies per group are of course sufficient. Note that, for all written work, the word limit includes section headers, footnotes, and everything else except for the reference list at the end of the essay. Penalties of one grade point per every 5 percentage points you go over the 10% threshold apply in accordance with School rules.

Midterm essay questions

Please choose *two* out of the four questions for your midterm essay. In your response, do make sure to draw on the existing arguments from the literature, develop these arguments with care, and do use examples to illustrate the point you want to make.

- *Question 1:* Discuss central trade-offs for IO formation and elaborate on how these affect the effective functioning of IOs.
- *Question 2:* “IOs are created by powerful and rich states to cement their power in international politics.” Critically discuss this statement.
- *Question 3:* To what extent is the principal-agent relationship of IO member states and the IO bureaucracy a problem for international cooperation?
- *Question 4:* Compliance is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for IO effectiveness. What motivates governments to comply with even non-shallow IOs?

Feedback

This course will offer a range of opportunities for feedback on your performance throughout the course. Feedback is given in various formats and from different sources:

- You will receive ongoing verbal feedback from myself and your peers in class discussions and student presentations; this of course requires active participation in lectures and seminars.

- You will receive written feedback on the written formative and summative assessments. In line with University policy, written feedback is returned within three working weeks. It is your responsibility to carefully read your feedback and consider recommendations for how you can improve your work. You are advised to discuss your feedback with me.
- You are encouraged to meet with me to discuss any questions/problems you may have with the course materials. Meetings are meant as an opportunity for you to seek guidance on your work and discuss any aspect of your coursework and assessments throughout the course.
- You can make use of a range of tailored support for postgraduate students made available by Student Learning Services, including the Writing Centre’s Academic Skills Writing Programme or one-to-one appointments with writing advisers. More information is available from their website: <http://www.gla.ac.uk/services/sls/offer/writing/>.

Course requirements

Course requirements are as follows:

- Regular attendance at lectures and seminars is mandatory and attendance will be taken.
- Active participation in lecture and seminar sessions is expected.
- All required readings are to be read before coming to class. Except for exceptional circumstances, attending seminars without the adequate preparation will not be tolerated.
- Brief verbal summaries of newspaper articles and a one-page summary (1.5 spacing) of a single academic journal article (if desired) as formative assessments.
- Midterm essay (2,000 words, 60% of grade), IO factsheet and presentation as group assignment (1,500 words, 30% of grade), and research note (500 words, 10% of grade) as summative assessments.

Communication and other policies

Communication: If you have any questions about any of the course materials or want to see me for any other reasons, e.g., feedback, please do send an email to request an appointment. Always include the questions or the reason for why you want to meet and provide a number of dates and times when you can meet. I will do my best to respond quickly, but daily email volumes can, at times, cause delays. Feel free to re-send your email should I have not responded for a week. Do not take advantage of seeing me, I am happy to do so, but please plan ahead as short notice meetings on, e.g., the next day are typically impossible.

In fact, this Learning Scientists blog post offers a great discussion of how to communicate with your professors in a professional and polite way. The post is available here: <https://goo.gl/tDt1T5>.

Mobile phones and computers: Unless instructed otherwise, I ask you to refrain from using mobile phones and laptop computers during lectures and seminars. Mobile phones should be silenced or switched off and put away in your bags. If you want to use laptop computers to take notes, please sit in back rows. Research has shown that laptop multitasking distracts not only *you*, but also

*other students around you.*¹ So please use computers wisely.

Use of course materials: Please note that according to University policy *all* course materials provided are for your *own personal use* and can only be used in relation to your studies. Any unauthorised distribution of course materials, including uploading them onto unauthorised web sites and social media sites, such as YouTube or Course Hero, will be considered in breach of the University's Code of Conduct and will be subject to disciplinary action.

Plagiarism

Plagiarism is a serious offence against academic integrity; it is defined by the University as follows: “The incorporation of material without formal and proper acknowledgement (even with no deliberate intent to cheat) can constitute plagiarism. Work may be considered to be plagiarised if it consists of: a direct quotation; a close paraphrase; an unacknowledged summary of a source; direct copying or transcription.”

It is your responsibility to familiarise yourself with what plagiarism is, what the consequences are, and how to protect your work against it. Further information and resources are provided online from this University website: <http://www.gla.ac.uk/services/sls/plagiarism/>

Readings and how to use the reading list

Readings for every session are listed below, and it is necessary that required readings are read *prior* to each session. Required readings are directly accessible via active links provided in the reading list below; for the links to work you need to access papers from within the University network or off-campus through your VPN client. To obtain a deeper understanding and to perform well in the class assignments, readings from the suggested readings section should be consulted, too. I expect you to do the best you can to get access to any additional readings, which should all be available through the University of Glasgow Library.

As a note of caution: You may find some of the readings challenging and possibly different from what you have been reading so far. As this is a postgraduate seminar, I would like to steer you towards more advanced readings in IO research rather than undergraduate textbooks. I expect you to carefully work through the assigned readings, which may take you longer than you initially think. Please do plan accordingly!

That said, rest assured that I never expect you to understand all the technical details, but I rather want you to get a good idea of what a paper's argumentative narrative is, and how it contributes to the overall themes discussed in class. Feel free to reach out to me if you have particular questions.

While I cannot emphasise reading primary literature enough, the following sources might be useful to get up to speed with much of the more advanced debates and arguments.

- Hurd, I. (2017). *International Organizations: Politics, Law, and Practice*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Carlsneas, W., Risse, T., and Simmons, B. A. (2013). *Handbook of International Relations*. SAGE, Thousand Oaks (available as [ebook](#)).

¹Sana, F., Weston, T., and Cepeda, N.J. (2013). Laptop Multitasking Hinders Classroom Learning for Both Users and Nearby Peers. *Computers & Education*, 62:24-31.

- Reus-Smit, C. and Snidal, D. (2008). *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Oxford University Press, Oxford (available as [ebook](#)).
- *Annual Reviews of Political Science* journal (available [here](#)).

PART I: ANALYTIC FOUNDATIONS

Week 1, January 8: *Introduction*

Required readings

- Martin, L. L. and Simmons, B. A. (1998). Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions. *International Organization*, 52(4):729–757. [[Link](#)]
- Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D. (1998). Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1):3–32. [[Link](#)]

Week 2, January 15: *IO formation and design*

Required readings

- Bernauer, T., Kalbhenn, A., Koubi, V., and Spilker, G. (2013). Is There a Depth versus Participation Dilemma in International Cooperation? *Review of International Organizations*, 8(4):477–497. [[Link](#)]
- Kucik, J. and Reinhardt, E. (2008). Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime. *International Organization*, 62(3):477–505. [[Link](#)]
- Thompson, A. and Verdier, D. (2014). Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Regime Design. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58(1):15–28. [[Link](#)]

Recommended readings

- Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D. (2000). Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. *International Organization*, 54(3):421–456.
- Copelovitch, M. S. and Putnam, T. L. (2014). Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation. *International Organization*, 68(2):471–493.
- Gilligan, M. J. (2004). Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-Off in International Multilateral Agreements? *International Organization*, 58(3):459–484.
- Hugh-Jones, D., Milewicz, K., and Ward, H. (2018). Signaling by Signature: The Weight of International Opinion and Ratification of Treaties by Domestic Veto Players. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 6(1):15–31.
- Lupu, Y. (2016). Why Do States Join Some Universal Treaties but Not Others? An Analysis of Treaty Commitment Preferences. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 60(7):1219–1250.

- Rosendorff, B. P. and Milner, H. V. (2001). The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. *International Organization*, 55(4):829–857.
- Rosendorff, B. P. (2005). Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Procedure. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3):389–400.
- Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., and Snidal, D. (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization*, 55(4):761–799.
- Koremenos, B. (2005). Contracting around International Uncertainty. *American Political Science Review*, 99(4):549–565.

Week 3, January 22: *Power and bargaining*

Required readings

- Carter, D. B. and Stone, R. W. (2015). Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly. *International Organization*, 69(1):1–33. [\[Link\]](#)
- Milewicz, K. M. and Snidal, D. (2016). Cooperation by Treaty: The Role of Multilateral Powers. *International Organization*, 70(4):823–844. [\[Link\]](#)
- Bayer, P., Marcoux, C., and Urpelainen, J. (2015). When International Organizations Bargain Evidence from the Global Environment Facility. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(6):1074–1100. [\[Link\]](#)

Recommended readings

- Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., and Vreeland, J. R. (2015). Politics and IMF Conditionality. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(1):120–148.
- Morrison, K. M. (2013). Membership No Longer Has Its Privileges: The Declining Informal Influence of Board Members on IDA Lending. *Review of International Organizations*, 8(2):291–312.
- Schneider, C. J. and Urpelainen, J. (2013). Distributional Conflict Between Powerful States and International Treaty Ratification. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(1):13–27.
- Steinberg, R. H. (2002). In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO. *International Organization*, 56(2):339–374.
- Stone, R. W. (2008). The Scope of IMF Conditionality. *International Organization*, 62(4):589–620.
- Tallberg, J., Dellmuth, L. M., Agnè, H., and Duit, A. (2018). Ngo influence in international organizations: Information, access and exchange. *British Journal of Political Science*, 48(1):213–238.
- Voeten, E. (2001). Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. *American Political Science Review*, 95(4):845–858.

Week 4, January 29: *Delegation, bureaucracy, and informal governance*

Required readings

- Nielson, D. L. and Tierney, M. J. (2003). Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform. *International Organization*, 57(2):241–276. [\[Link\]](#)
- Johnson, T. and Urpelainen, J. (2014). International Bureaucrats and the Formation of Inter-governmental Organizations: Institutional Design Discretion Sweetens the Pot. *International Organization*, 68(1):177–209. [\[Link\]](#)
- Chwioroth, J. M. (2013). “The Silent Revolution:” How the Staff Exercise Informal Governance over IMF Lending. *Review of International Organizations*, 8(2):265–290. [\[Link\]](#)

Recommended readings

- Bayer, P., Marcoux, C., and Urpelainen, J. (2014). Choosing International Organizations: When Do States and the World Bank Collaborate on Environmental Projects? *Review of International Organizations*, 9(4):413–440.
- Fang, S. and Stone, R. W. (2012). International Organizations as Policy Advisors. *International Organization*, 66(4):537–569.
- Franchino, F. (2004). Delegating Powers in the European Community. *British Journal of Political Science*, 34(2):269–293.
- Johns, L. (2007). A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats. *International Organization*, 61(2):245–275.
- McLean, E. V. (2012). Donors’ Preferences and Agent Choice: Delegation of European Development Aid. *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(2):381–395.
- Pollack, M. A. (1997). Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community. *International Organization*, 51(1):99–134.

Week 5, February 5: *Compliance and enforcement*

Required readings

- Downs, G. W., Rocke, D. M., and Barsoom, P. N. (1996). Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? *International Organization*, 50(3):379–406. [\[Link\]](#)
- Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2005). Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression. *International Organization*, 59(3):593–629. [\[Link\]](#)
- Stone, R. W. (2004). The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4):577–591. [\[Link\]](#)

Recommended readings

- Dai, X. (2005). Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism. *International Organization*, 59(2):363–398.
- Fearon, J. D. (1998). Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation. *International Organization*, 52(2):269–305.
- Johns, L. and Pelc, K. J. (2018). Free-Riding on Enforcement in the WTO. Forthcoming in *Journal of Politics*.
- Mitchell, R. B. (1994). Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance. *International Organization*, 48(3):425–458.
- Simmons, B. A. (2000). International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs. *American Political Science Review*, 94(4):819–835.
- Simmons, B. (2010). Treaty Compliance and Violation. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13(1):273–296.
- von Stein, J. (2005). Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty Compliance. *American Political Science Review*, 99(4):611–622

Week 6, February 12: IO effectiveness

Required readings

- Barnett, M. N. and Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4):699–732. [\[Link\]](#)
- Buntaine, M. T., Parks, B. C., and Buch, B. P. (2017). Aiming at the Wrong Targets: The Domestic Consequences of International Efforts to Build Institutions. *International Studies Quarterly*, 61(2):471–488. [\[Link\]](#)
- Gray, J. (2018). Life, Death, or Zombies? The Vitality of International Economic Organizations. Forthcoming in *International Studies Quarterly*. [Available from Moodle]

Recommended readings

- Carnegie, A. and Marinov, N. (2017). Foreign Aid, Human Rights, and Democracy Promotion: Evidence from a Natural Experiment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(3):671–683.
- Chaudoin, S., Hays, J., and Hicks, R. (2016). Do We Really Know the WTO Cures Cancer? Forthcoming in *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Gilligan, M. J. (2006). Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime. *International Organization*, 60(4):935–967.
- Helm, C. and Sprinz, D. F. (2000). Measuring the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(5):630–652.

- Hill, Daniel W., J. (2010). Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior. *Journal of Politics*, 72(4):1161–1174.
- Lipsky, P. Y. (2015). Explaining Institutional Change: Policy Areas, Outside Options, and the Bretton Woods Institutions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(2):341–356.
- Lupu, Y. (2013). The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4):912–925.
- Rose, A. K. (2004-03). Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? *American Economic Review*, 94(1):98–114.
- Goldstein, J. L., Rivers, D., and Tomz, M. (2007). Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization*, 61(1):37–67.
- Voeten, E. (2014). Does participation in international organizations increase cooperation? *Review of International Organizations*, 9(3):285–308.

Week 7, February 19: *Reading week—no class*

PART II: APPLICATIONS

Week 8, February 26: *Economics relations*

Required readings

- Davis, C. L. and Wilf, M. (2017). Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO. *Journal of Politics*, 79(3):964–978 [\[Link\]](#)
- Pelc, K. J. (2013). Googling the WTO: What Search-Engine Data Tell Us About the Political Economy of Institutions. *International Organization*, 67(3):629–655. [\[Link\]](#)
- Malik, R. and Stone, R. W. (2018). Corporate Influence in World Bank Lending. Forthcoming in *Journal of Politics* [\[Link\]](#)

Week 9, March 5: *International and human security*

Required readings

- Thompson, A. (2006). Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. *International Organization*, 60(1):1–34. [\[Link\]](#)
- Hafner-Burton, E. (2008). Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem. *International Organization*, 62(4):689–716. [\[Link\]](#)
- Conrad, C. R. and Ritter, E. H. (2013). Treaties, Tenure, and Torture: The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law. *Journal of Politics*, 75(2):397–409. [\[Link\]](#)

Week 10, March 12: *Other IOs*

Required readings

- Schneider, C. (2011). Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(2):331–355. [\[Link\]](#)
- von Stein, J. (2008). The International Law and Politics of Climate Change. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(2):243–268. [\[Link\]](#)
- Jensen, N. M. and Malesky, E. J. (2017). Nonstate Actors and Compliance with International Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Forthcoming in *International Organization*. [\[Link\]](#)

Week 11, March 19: *International courts*

Required readings

- Voeten, E. (2008). The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights. *American Political Science Review*, 102(4):417–433. [\[Link\]](#)
- Chapman, T. L. and Chaudoin, S. (2013). Ratification Patterns and the International Criminal Court. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(2):400–409. [\[Link\]](#)
- Chaudoin, S. (2016). How Contestation Moderates the Effects of International Institutions: The International Criminal Court and Kenya. *Journal of Politics*, 78(2):557–571. [\[Link\]](#)